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THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 
Eleonore Stump 
This paper considers briefly the approach to the problem of evil by Alvin Plantinga, 
Richard Swinburne, and John Hick and argues that none of these approaches is entirely 
satisfactory. The paper then develops a different strategy for dealing with the problem 
of evil by expounding and taking seriously three Christian claims relevant to the problem: 
Adam fell; natural evil entered the world as a result of Adam's fall; and after death human 
beings go either to heaven or hell. Properly interpreted, these claims form the basis for 
a consistent and coherent Christian solution to the problem of evil. 
Introduction 
The problem of evil traditionally has been understood as an apparent inconsis-
tency in theistic beliefs. I Orthodox believers of all three major monotheisms, 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, are committed to the truth of the following 
claims about God: 
(l) God is omnipotent; 
(2) God is omniscient; 
(3) God is perfectly good. 
Reasonable people of all persuasions are also committed to this claim: 
(4) There is evil in the world; 
and many theists in particular are bound to maintain the truth of (4) in virtue of 
their various doctrines of the afterlife or the injunctions of their religion against 
evil. The view that (1)-(4) are logically incompatible has become associated with 
Hume in virtue of Philo's position in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 
though many other philosophers have maintained if, including in recent years 
J.L. Mackie3 and H.J. McCloskey.' As other philosophers have pointed out, 
however, Philo's view that there is a logical inconsistency in (l )-(4) alone is 
mistaken. 5 To show such an inconsistency, one would need at least to demonstrate 
that this claim must be true: 
(5) There is no morally sufficient reason for God to allow instances of 
evil. 
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Since Hume, there have been attempts to solve the problem of evil by attacking 
or reinterpreting one of the first four assumptions. Mill, for example, suggested 
a radical weakening of (1) and (2);6 and according to Mill, Mansel reinterpreted 
(3) in such a way as almost to make (4) follow from it, by in effect claiming 
that God's goodness might include attributes which we consider evil by human 
standards.7 But for reasons which I think are obvious, theists have generally 
been unwilling to avail themselves of such solutions; and most attempts at solving 
the problem, especially recently, have concentrated on strategies for rejecting 
(5). Some of these attempted rejections of (5) make significant contributions to 
our understanding of the problem, but none of them, I think, ultimately constitutes 
a successful solution of the problem. In this paper, I will briefly review what 
seem to me three of the most promising discussions of the problem of evil and 
then develop in detail a different solution of my own by presenting and defending 
a morally sufficient reason for God to allow instances of evil. 
I 
Plantinga's presentation of the free will defense is a landmark in contemporary 
discussions of the problem of evil. As Plantinga expounds it,8 the free will 
defense rests on these two philosophical claims, which it adds to the theological 
assumptions (l )-(3): 
and 
(6) Human beings have free will; 
(7) Possession of free will and use of it to do more good than evil is a 
good of such value that it outweighs all the evil in the world. 
Plantinga uses these assumptions to argue that a morally sufficient reason for 
God to pennit evil is possible: the value of man's possession and use of free 
will is a possible reason for God's pennitting moral evil, which is evil caused 
by man. The value of the fallen angel's possession of free will is a possible 
reason for God's pennitting natural evil, evil which is not caused by human free 
choice but which (Plantinga suggests) could be attributed to the freely chosen 
actions of fallen angels. As long as it is possible that there be a morally sufficient 
reason for God to allow evil, regardless of whether or not that possibility is 
actualized, the existence of evil is not logically incompatible with the existence 
of a good God. 
Plantinga's work has generated considerable discussion, which cannot be effec-
tively summarized here. 9 But for my purposes perhaps the most interesting criti-
cism is the objection that even if we grant Plantinga's free will defense everything 
it wants and needs, what results does not seem to be even a candidate for a 
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morally sufficient reason justifying God's permitting instances of evil. In "The 
Irrelevance of the Free Will Defense", 10 Steven Boer has argued that nothing in 
the grant of free will to creatures entails that creatures always be able successfully 
to inflict the harm which they have willed. It is possible that God allow his 
creatures to be free with respect to their willing and yet prevent by natural or 
supernatural means the suffering which their evil will and actions aim at. Thus, 
for example, God could allow Smith to will to murder Jones and to act on that 
will by hiring killers to shoot Jones, and at the same time God could warn Jones 
of Smith's intentions in time for Jones to run away and hide until Smith's wrath 
had subsided. By warning Jones God would prevent the evil of Jones' murder 
without interfering with Smith's exercise of free will. Many critics of Plantinga's 
position are bothered by the fact that they cannot seriously entertain the notion 
that Plantinga's possible sufficient reason for evil might actually obtain. The 
thought that all natural evil might be caused by fallen angels seems to many a 
particularly implausible view. This criticism does not especially worry Plantinga, 
however, because his purpose was to show not what God's reason for allowing 
evil is but rather just that there could be such a reason; and this is all he needs 
to show in order to refute those who think that the existence of God is logically 
incompatible with the existence of evil. Plantinga's strategy is similar in his 
arguments against those who hold the weaker view that the existence of evil 
renders it improbable that God exist. II He does not attempt a justification for 
God's allowing evil which would diminish the critic's sense of the improbability 
of God's existence. Rather he argues that the critic has not made his case. 
Judgments of a claim's probability are relative to a knower's whole set of beliefs. 
But a theist's set of beliefs includes the belief that God exists, so that atheists' 
assessments of the probability of God's existence given the existence of evil will 
not be the same as theists'. Therefore, the atheist critic's argument that God's 
existence is improbable is not telling against theism. 
The problem with Plantinga's general strategy for the defense of theism against 
arguments from evil is that it leaves the presence of evil in the actual world 
mysterious. Plantinga's tendency is to show the weaknesses inherent in arguments 
from evil, not to provide a theodicy, and so it yields no explanation for why we 
in this world suffer from evil if our world is governed by a good God. No doubt 
many people, including Plantinga, would not find this result problematic. In 
fact, in a recent paper Steven Wykstra has argued that given the limitlessness 
of God's intellect and the finitude of ours, the mysteriousness of evil in our 
world is just what we might expect;12 it is reasonable to suppose that we cannot 
understand why an omniscient and omnipotent entity does what he does. I think 
that there is some plausibility in Wykstra's thesis; and if all efforts at theodicy 
fail utterly, no doubt theists will be glad of arguments like Wykstra's and content 
with strategies like Plantinga's. The problem with such arguments and strategies, 
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to put it crudely, is that they leave people on both sides of the issue unsatisfied. 
The atheist is inclined to claim, as William Rowe does in a recent paper,13 that 
it is apparent there is no justifying or overriding good for some evils that occur 
in the world. To tell such an atheist that he hasn't succeeded in undermining 
theists' beliefs in the existence of such a good although they don't know what 
it is, or that his inability to see such a good is just what theists would expect, 
is likely to strike him as less than a powerful response. As for the theist struggling 
with the problem of evil, even if he entertains no anxieties about the rationality 
of his theistic belief in consequence of the existence of evil, he may well still 
be weakened in his religious belief by the consideration that the deity in whom 
he is to place his trust seems to act in ways which are unintelligible to him at 
best and apparently evil at worst. So, if it is at all possible to do so, it seems 
worth trying to construct a more positive explanation for the compatibility of 
God and evil; and such an explanation is in fact what we find in the work of 
Swinburne and Hick. 
Swinburne's recently published solution to the problem of evil involves in 
effect an alteration of (7). What we value about free will, according to Swinburne, 
is not merely our possession of it or the balance of moral good over moral evil 
which it produces but rather our ability to exercise it in significant ways in the 
"choice of destiny and responsibility. "14 Without significant exercise of free will, 
Swinburne argues, we would live like God's pets, inhabiting a toy world in 
which God would reserve to himself all the important decisions. 15 To accommo-
date Swinburne's view, then, we ought to reformulate Plantinga's (7) as 
(7') Significant exercise of free will with a choice of destiny, with "the 
opportunity to bring about serious evils or prevent their occurrence,"16 
is of such great value that it outweighs all the evil in the world. 
Swinburne builds his own solution to the problem of evil on (7'). The morally 
sufficient reason for God's allowing instances of evil is that the significant 
exercise of human free will is worth the evil it involves. Moral evil is readily 
explicable on this view: God does not prevent human beings from accomplishing 
the ends of their evil wills, because to do so consistently would be to deprive 
them of the significant exercise of their free wills and reduce them to the status 
of pets. But natural evil, evil not caused by human choices, is harder to explain. 
Swinburne tries to justify it by claiming that natural evil is necessary for a certain 
sort of knowledge, which is itself necessary for significant exercise of free will, 
so that God could not take away instances of natural evil without also taking 
away the significant exercise of human free will. The connection between natural 
evil and free will Swinburne explains in this way. We could not know the 
consequences of our choices, according to Swinburne, without the existence of 
natural evil. Unless someone died accidentally of cyanide poisoning, for example, 
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or unless people died of rabies, we would not have the significant choice of 
trying to prevent cyanide poisoning or rabies. Similarly, if there were no earth-
quakes, we would not have the choice of building or refusing to build cities on 
fault lines, of helping or refusing to help earthquake victims. 17 
The weakest part of this solution to the problem of evil seems to me to be its 
attempted justification of natural evil. 18 Contrary to Swinburne, I think that the 
knowledge Swinburne values does not require natural evils; it can be acquired 
in a number of other ways. In particular, for example, God could inform men, 
directly or indirectly, of the consequences of their choices, and it is clear from 
various Biblical stories that God could do so without infringing the human 
freedom which Swinburne is concerned to safeguard. 19 Furthermore, the particular 
knowledge gained from the occurrence of natural evil and the choices it provides 
is valuable, Swinburne seems to argue, simply because free will can consequently 
be exercised in serious choices. But the world would contain ample opportunity 
for significant exercise of free will even without natural evil. Belsen and 
Hiroshima were the results of significant exercises of free will, and those free 
choices would have been possible even if the world contained no birth defects, 
cancer, tornadoes, or drought. So I think Swinburne's solution cannot justify 
the natural evils of this world even ifhis case concerning moral evil is convincing. 
Hick's solution to the problem of evil, like Swinburne's, consists in effect in 
an alteration of (7); and though Hick's work was published before Swinburne's, 
it can be conveniently thought of as providing a complicated addition to the 
formulation of (7) underlying Swinburne's solution. 20 On Hick's view, (7) should 
be reformulated in this way: 
(7") Significant exercise of free will in the enterprise of soul-making is 
of such great value that it outweighs all the evil in the world. 
Soul-making, on Hick's view, is the process by which human beings develop 
certain traits of character, such as patience, courage, and compassion, as a result 
of struggling with evils. Those who successfully complete this process will be 
admitted to the kingdom of God, in which there is no evil. The evil in the world 
is logically necessary for soul-making and so cannot be prevented if the process 
of soul-making is to be preserved. 
Hick's solution to the problem of evil has received a great deal of attention 
in the literature,21 but the most effective criticism of it, I think, is Stanley Kane's. 22 
He argues that the traits of character so valued by Hick in fact do not require 
the existence of evil for their development or display: 
Courage and fortitude, for instance, could manifest themselves as the 
persistence, steadfastness, and perseverance it takes to accomplish well 
any difficult or demanding long-range task-the writing of a doctoral 
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dissertation, for example, or training for and competing in the Olympic 
Games .... Compassion could be evidenced in the sympathy and fellow-
feeling that a person could show for someone engaged in one of these 
long-range enterprises .... It is hard to see why a man or a woman 
cannot develop just as much patience, fortitude and strength of character 
in helping his or her spouse complete a doctoral dissertation as in caring 
for a sick child through a long and serious illness. It is hard to see why 
people cannot learn just as much of the spirit of help and cooperation 
by teaming together to win an athletic championship as by coming 
together to rescue a town leveled by a tornado or inundated by aflood. 23 
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Even apart from this objection, Kane argues, Hick's solution is vitiated by an 
absurdity in the general scheme he postulates. According to Hick, evil is justified 
by man's acquisition of intrinsically valuable character traits which require the 
existence of evil for their development and display. Those who develop these 
character traits will be admitted to heaven where there is no evil and where, 
consequently, it is impossible to manifest the character traits they have acquired. 
But this is senseless, Kane maintains. On Hick's view, all the evils in the world 
are justified as a means of developing traits of character which it will be impossible 
to maintain thereafter in heaven, the reward for having developed such character 
traits. Why should we value a process which results in a character which cannot 
then be manifested? And if it is the possession rather than the manifestation of 
these character traits which is valued, so that what is wanted is a certain dispos-
ition, which can be had in heaven even in the absence of evil, then it is not clear 
why God could not have imparted the disposition without the evil or why evil 
in the world is justified by the acquisition of such dispositions. 24 I think Hick 
has no good answers to these questions. 25 
II 
No doubt there are other ingenious ways of altering (7), but the many objections 
to the carefully worked-out solutions by Plantinga, Swinburne, and Hick suggest 
that (6) and a version of (7) by themselves are an insufficient foundation for a 
satisfactory solution to the problem of evil. Reflection on the nature of the 
problem seems to me to confirm this suggestion. The problem of evil is generally 
presented as some sort of inconsistency in theistic beliefs, and (1)-(4) present 
the relevant theistic assumptions. And yet mere theists are relatively rare in the 
history of religion. Most people who accept (1 )-(4) are Jews or Christians or 
Muslims. If we are going to claim that their beliefs are somehow inconsistent, 
we need to look at a more complete set of Jewish or Muslim or Christian beliefs 
concerning God's goodness and evil in the world, not just at that limited subset 
398 Faith and Philosophy 
of such beliefs which are common to all three religions, because what appears 
inconsistent if we take a partial sampling of beliefs may in fact look consistent 
when set in the context of a more complete set of beliefs. I do not of course 
mean to suggest that an inconsistent set of propositions could become consistent 
if we add more propositions to it. My point is simple and commonsensical: that 
the appearance of inconsistency in a set of beliefs may arise from our interpretation 
of those beliefs, and our reinterpretation of them in light of a larger system of 
beliefs to which they belong may dispel the appearance of inconsistency. 26 A 
more promising foundation for a solution to the problem of evil, then, might be 
found if we consider a broader range of beliefs concerning the relations of God 
to evil in the world, which are specific to a particular monotheism. 
Furthermore, attempted solutions to the problem of evil based solely on a few 
theistic assumptions common to the major monotheisms are likely themselves 
to be incompatible with Jewish or Christian or Islamic beliefs. Swinburne's 
attempted solution, for example, seems incompatible with traditional Christian 
beliefs about heaven. On Swinburne's account, we are more like pets than 
humans unless we have significant exercise of our free will, and natural evil is 
necessary for such a significant exercise. But there is no natural evil in heaven 
and so, according to Swinburne's position, no significant exercise of free will 
either. Hence, on Swinburne's account, persons in heaven are not perfected in 
virtue of their translation to heaven, as Christian doctrine has traditionally 
claimed, but rather diminished in status. Thoughtful Christians troubled by the 
problem of evil, then, are not likely to be reassured by Swinburne's solution. 
For these reasons, in what follows I will focus on one particular monotheism, 
namely, Christianity; I do not know enough about Judaism or Islam to present 
a discussion of the problem of evil in the context of those religions. In fact, my 
account will not deal even with all varieties of Christian belief. Because my 
account will depend on a number of assumptions, such as that man has free will, 
it will present a solution to the problem of evil applicable only to those versions 
of Christianity which accept those assumptions. Christians who reject a belief 
in free will, for example, will also reject my attempt at a solution to the problem 
of evil. 
Besides (1)-(4), there are three Christian beliefs that seem to me especially 
relevant to the problem of evil. They are these: 
(8) Adam fell. 
(9) Natural evil entered the world as a result of Adam's fall. 
(lO) After death, depending on their state at the time of their death, 
either (a) human beings go to heaven or (b) they go to hellY 
It is clear that these beliefs themselves raise a host of problems, partly because 
they seem implausible or just plain false and partly because they seem to raise 
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the problem of evil again in their own right. In this section I will consider worries 
raised by these beliefs themselves; in the next section I will argue that these 
three beliefs together with a new formulation of (7) provide a basis for a Christian 
solution to the problem of evil for those varieties of Christian belief which accept 
(1 )-(4) and (6)-(10). The applicability of this solution to monotheisms other than 
Christianity depends on whether they accept these beliefs. 
It would, of course, make a difference to my solution if any of the beliefs 
added in (8)-(10) could be demonstrated to be false, and so I will devote this 
section of the paper primarily to arguing that though (8)-(10) are controversial 
and seem false to many people, they are not demonstrably false. The fact that 
the problem of evil is raised again by (8)-(10) in conjunction with (1)-(3) is also 
worrisome. If a solution to the problem of evil relies on (8)-(10) and (8)-(10) 
themselves raise the problem, the problem is not solved but simply pushed back 
a stage. If (8)-(10) are to serve as the basis for an effective solution, the appearance 
they give of being inconsistent with the existence of a good God must be dispelled; 
attempting to do so is my other main concern in this section. If I can show that 
these beliefs are not demonstrably false and are not themselves incompatible 
with belief in a good God, which is all I want to do in this section, it will then 
be possible for me in the next section to use (8)-(10) in my attempted solution 
to the problem of evil. 
The Christian belief summarized as (10) appears to raise the problem of evil 
because it gives rise to questions such as these: 
(Q 1) If an omnipotent God could bring it about that aU human beings 
be in heaven and if a good God would want no human beings in hell, 
wouldn't ~ good, omnipotent God bring it about that aU human beings 
be in heaven? 
(Q2) Even if an omnipotent God does not bring it about that aU human 
beings be in heaven, how could a good omnipotent God allow any 
human beings to suffer torment in heU? 
(Q3) How could a good, just God decree that some human beings suffer 
torment for an infinite time for evils done during a finite human lifetime? 
(Q4) Wouldn't a good God give all those in hell "a second chance," 
thereby ensuring that all human beings, or virtually all, be brought to 
heaven? 
No doubt (10) raises more questions concerning God's goodness, but these are 
the ones most commonly raised by philosophers and other reflective people 
concerned with these issues. 28 I cannot do justice to these difficult questions in 
this paper; but without destroying the usefulness of (10) in my solution to the 
problem of evil, I can do enough, I think, to show that (10) can be interpreted 
in a way which significantly diminishes or dispells the appearance that it is 
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incompatible with God's goodness. 
To begin with, on Christian doctrine heaven should be understood not as some 
place with gates of pearl and streets of gold but rather as a spiritual state of 
union with God; and union with God should be understood to involve as a 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition the state of freely willing only what is 
in accordance with the will of God. This understanding of heaven, which is 
traditional in the history of Christian thought,29 goes some way towards answering 
(Ql). If, as I think and as has been well argued elsewhere,3D it is not logically 
possible for God to make human beings do anything freely, and if heaven is as 
I have described it, then it is not within God's power to insure that all human 
beings will be in heaven, because it is not within his power to determine what 
they freely will. 
An answer to (Q2) also can be sketched by looking more closely at the Christian 
doctrine being questioned. Hell is commonly regarded as God's torture chamber, 
and it is considered fearsome because of the unending physical torments imposed 
by God on those sent there. This is, of course, a conception of hell which has 
been promoted by various popular preachers and has its roots in biblical Chris-
tianity; passages such as Matt. 25:41-46 and Luke 16: 19-26 have been cited in 
support of it. And yet even a cursory look at traditional Christian writings shows 
that this is a crude and simplistic account of the doctrine of hell. For example, 
Dante, who has given perhaps the most famous Christian description of hell, 
includes as part of hell something like what Socrates was hoping for as other-
worldly bliss: 31 a beautiful, bright place with green meadows and gentle streams 
in which the noblest and wisest of the ancients discuss philosophy. 32 This is part 
of Limbo, and on Dante's view it is in hell and fearsome. What makes Limbo 
awful is not physical tortures or spiritual torments, of which there are none, but 
rather the fact that the people there are separated from union with God and will 
always be so; and for Dante, I think, that is the fundamental awfulness of all 
the rest of the hell, too. 
Dante, of course, has also given us some of our most graphic images of hellish 
tortures, but there is something odd about the tortures in Dante's hell. Dante 
portrays Ulysses as perpetually in the process of being consumed by fire, and 
yet he also has Ulysses deliver a long and elaborate speech; Farinata is being 
tortured in a burning iron tomb but he engages in a proud and leisurely conver-
sation with Dante the traveler. In short, although Dante is the source for some 
of the most frightful representations of hell's punishments, he does not represent 
the people in hell as suffering from those punishments in the way human beings 
ordinarily would suffer them; no man who was on fire and had been so for some 
time would be capable of the calm, lengthy speech Ulysses makes. One might, 
of course, suppose that putting such speeches into the mouths of the tortured 
damned is just a poetic device for Dante; but such a supposition seems implausible 
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to me for several reasons. To state just one, I think it highly unlikely that Dante 
meant to portray hell as a place where people are being literally burned by real 
fire because none of the persons in Dante's hell other than Dante the traveler is 
embodied, and it is improbable that Dante believed fire could bum souls in the 
way it bums bodies. Rather Dante's idea of hell, which strikes me as philosophi-
cally and theologically interesting, seems to have been that the pains a person 
such as Ulysses suffers are not so much an externally imposed physical punish-
ment as they are an external manifestation of a person's inner state, resulting 
from that person's previous and current free choices. Thus, on Dante's view, if 
I understand it correctly, the torments of hell are not physical pains which God 
has chosen to add to the burden of hell's inhabitants but the natural psychological 
state of those who have habitually made bad choices and whose will is not 
conformable to the divine will. 
On Dante's view, then, the essence of Hell consists in the absence of union 
with God, a condition entailed by a person's psychological state which is a result 
of that person's free choices and which is naturally painful. (By a naturally 
painful psychological state I mean that human beings, in consequence of the 
nature they have, experience the state in question as painful; it is open to God 
to produce that state in people without the pain but only at the cost of altering 
their nature. Humiliation and grief seem to me examples of naturally painful 
psychological states.) On this view of hell which I have been attributing to Dante, 
an answer to (Q2) might go along these lines. Everlasting life in hell is the 
ultimate evil which can befall a person in this world; but the torments of hell 
are the natural conditions of some persons, and God can spare such persons 
those pains only by depriving them of their nature or their existence. And it is 
arguable that, of the alternatives open to God, maintaining such persons in 
existence and as human is the best. 33 
I am not arguing that this view of hell is the only one or even necessarily the 
right one for Christians to have; nor have I presented any argument for the 
account of human psychology on which this view is based. What I am claiming 
is that the view described here, which I will call the Dantean view, has a place 
in traditional Christian theology and that a philosophical case could be made for 
it. For present purposes I will take the Dantean view as the Christian view of 
Hell, and I will take (lOb) and all other talk of hell in this paper as referring to 
hell in the Dantean sense. Of the various views of hell I know, the Dantean 
view seems to me the one most likely to be philosophically defensible, and it 
is entirely adequate for the solution to the problem of evil I will develop. But 
the Dantean view is a comparatively mild view of hell. Many Christian thinkers 
have believed God imposed terrible physical torments on those in hell as punish-
ment for their sins in addition to their natural psychological pains. This is a 
much stronger view of hell than the Dantean view, and it raises a host of problems. 
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The strong version of (lOb), for example, raises the problem of evil in a way 
that can be settled only by considering whether retributive punishment is morally 
justifiable, what criteria we use to determine the degree of punishment appropriate 
to a crime, what the nature of the crimes punished in hell is, and many other 
questions, which plainly require lengthy treatment and cannot be dealt with in 
passing in this paper. If hell understood in this strong sense as including retributive 
punishment can be shown consistent with the existence of a good God, then my 
solution will be compatible with that strong interpretation; nothing in my solution 
rules out the strong version of hell if such a hell can be shown to be founded 
on justice and love, as Dante claimed for his version of hell. 34 On the other 
hand, if hell on the strong interpretation cannot be shown consistent with God's 
goodness, my solution will still hold; but there will be a dilemma for Christian 
belief: either to give up the strong interpretation of hell or to accept it and with 
it a version of the problem of evil which is insoluble by rational means. 
The answer to (Q2), then, is also the answer to (Q3): on the Dantean view, 
hell is the natural state and, even understood as unending, it is arguably the best 
possible state of those whose free wills are not in conformity with the divine 
will, on the assumption that continued existence as a human being even with 
pain is more valuable than the absence of that pain at the cost of one's existence 
or human nature. 
As for (Q4), I do not think it poses much of a problem. It seems reasonable 
to suppose and it is traditional Christian doctrine,l5 that God always wills the 
good for its own sake. So to will in accordance with God's will, a man must 
also will the good for its own sake. The assumption behind (Q4) is that anyone 
who has once had a taste of hell would henceforth do whatever he had to do to 
avoid hell. But then such a person would be willing the good not for its own 
sake but for the sake of avoiding hell. Such a person's will would thus not be 
in conformity with God's will, and so it would not be possible for God to bring 
it about that such a person participate in the union with God which is essential 
to life in heaven. 36 
The Christian belief in the fall of Adam, expressed in (8), has been interpreted 
in many ways. 37 Some (but not all) of these interpretations are incompatible with 
the theory ·of evolution; and if the current theory of evolution is provably true, 
such interpretations can be shown to be false and so cannot be used in any 
effective attempt to solve the problem of evil. My solution, however, will rely 
on only a few elements which are common to many interpretations of (8) and 
not incompatible with the theory of evolution, namely, that 
(8') (a) at some time in the past as a result of their own choices human 
beings altered their nature for the worse, 
(b) the alteration involved what we perceive and describe as a change 
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in the nature of human free Will,38 and 
(c) the changed nature of the will was inheritable. 
(8') is compatible with the denial (as well as with the affirmation) that there 
once was a particular man named Adam who fell from a better to a worse state 
in consequence of a bad choice, but for the sake of convenience I will continue 
to refer to the events described in (8') as 'Adam's fall'. Nothing in the theory 
of evolution entails the falsity of any part of (8'), and (8') is compatible with 
any number of interpretations of (8). 
Of course, the fact that the theory of evolution does not entail the falsity of 
(8) understood as (8') does not rule out the possibility that (8) is demonstrably 
false for some other reason. The historical claim of (8'a) will strike many people 
as implausible, unsupported by evidence, the product of neurotic psychological 
forces, and so on. But although such reactions show that (8') is controversial, 
they are of course not sufficient to show that (8') is false. A more promising 
line of attack on (8') involves (8'b) or (8' c). What a change in the nature of the 
will is supposed to be is unclear, but any sensible account of such a change 
would, it seems, have to be incompatible with the notion that such a change in 
the will is inheritable. A reply to this objection requires a closer examination of 
the traditional Christian understanding of the will and its post-fall alteration. 
One of the classic expositions of this understanding is that given by Anselm. 39 
Anselm's theory of the will is very different from most contemporary accounts,40 
and I cannot do it justice in this paper. I want to present just enough of the 
theory to show the difference it makes to an evaluation of (8). According to 
Anselm, human beings originally had wills disposed to will as they ought to 
will and an ability to preserve that disposition. This ability is what Anselm calls 
free will. On Anselm's view, free will is a strength. The capacity for either 
getting sick or staying healthy, Anselm would say, is not a strength, only the 
capacity to stay healthy is. Similarly, Anselm maintains that the ability to will 
what one ought to will or what one ought not to will is not a strength and cannot 
count as free will: only the ability to will what one ought to will is a strength 
and it alone is free will. Human beings in their pre-fall state could do evil because 
as finite beings they could be less than they had the strength to be. They could 
fail to use their strength to preserve the uprightness of their wills and so fall into 
evil. Adam's fall consists in such a failure. In consequence of past failure of 
this sort, human beings have lost their initial disposition to will what they ought 
to will and acquired instead a disposition to will what they ought not to will. 
This acquired disposition consists primarily of an inclination to will one's own 
power or pleasure in preference to greater goods;4l it was and is inheritable. 
Although human beings still have some sort of ability to do good after the fall, 
because of the disposition of their will they find it very difficult (but not impos-
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sible) to resist evil. To this extent, then, their free will (in Anselm's sense of 
'free will') is diminished. 
The notion of a disposition of the will which is operative in this account needs 
to be understood in light of Anselm's unusual definition of free will. A free will 
is a will disposed to will the good and able to maintain such a disposition. In 
Aquinas's development of Anselm's account, recognition of what is good is the 
job of reason; and the righteous disposition of free will is a function of a right 
relationship among reason, the will, and desire. 42 For the will to be free, desire 
must be subject to reason, and reason must guide both the will and desire to 
what really is good. The post-fall disposition of the will is the result of a 
disordered relationship among these three. Desire is not subject to reason; often 
enough it governs reason instead. And rather than being guided by reason, the 
will tends to be moved by irrational desire, so that it wills an apparent or partial 
good rather than what is really or wholly good. This disordered relationship 
among reason, the will, and desire on Aquinas's view constitutes the change in 
the will produced by Adam's fall!3 The original inclination of the will to will 
the good proposed by reason has been lost and replaced by an inclination to will 
what is sought as good by the appetites. These inclinations are inclinations of 
the will itself, not external constraints on the will; and they are only inclinations 
or tendencies, not necessitated willing. Post-fall evil is voluntary, not compelled. 
On the other hand, this account lends plausibility to the claim that the altered 
disposition of the will is inheritable. What is said to be inherited is not a certain 
set of acts of will or a specific habit of willing but rather a weakened influence 
of reason and strengthened influence of appetite on the will, a loss of the will's 
natural inclination to follow reason. There is nothing obviously incoherent, as 
far as I can see, in supposing this change in the relationship of reason, will, and 
desire to be inheritable. 
(8) also raises the problem of evil in two ways which must be briefly considered 
here: 
(Q5) In view of all the subsequent evil occasioned by Adam's fall, 
shouldn't a good God have destroyed the human race immediately after 
Adam's fall? 
(Q6) Couldn't God have prevented the human race from inheriting this 
evil inclination of will after Adam's fall, by some miraculous interven-
tion in human history if necessary? 
The answer to (Q5), I think, is that 'ending is better than mending' is not a 
principle appropriate to Christianity. On Christian doctrine, persons once created 
are everlasting and infinitely valuable; if they become defective, it is up to a 
good God not to eliminate them but to fix them if he can. This view, of course, 
is not peculiar to Christianity. If a family has a child with a possibly terminal, 
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genetically transmissible disease, it does not usually consider destroying the 
child, but instead puts the child and the rest of the family to a great deal of pain 
and trouble caring for the child and trying to alleviate or cure the disease. 
(Q6) is harder to deal with. Without destroying any of his creatures, God 
could have prevented the transmission of a defective free will in any number of 
ways. He could have prevented procreation on the part of the defective people, 
for example, or he could miraculously have prevented the transmissible defect 
from actually being transmitted. But I think there are two things to be said against 
these alternatives. In the first place they constitute in effect the abrogation of 
God's first creation; they put an end to the first human beings God produced. 
If God were then to replace these human beings by others and they also corrupted 
their wills, God would then presumably replace them also, and so on, in what 
appears to be a series of frustrations and defeats inappropriate to a deity. It seems 
to me arguable that there is more power and dignity and also more love and care 
in restoring fallen humanity to a good state than in ending and replacing it. 
Secondly, Swinburne seems to me right in maintaining that what makes God's 
human creatures persons rather than pets is the ability to exercise their free will 
in serious choices. If God immediately removed or prevented the consequences 
of any free choice eventuating in major evil, his creatures would not have that 
significant exercise of free will and would thus not be persons. 
or 
As for (9), it can be read in either of these two ways: 
(9') There were no diseases, tornadoes, droughts, etc. in the world until 
Adam's fall; 
(9") no person suffered from diseases, tornadoes, droughts, etc. until 
Adam's fall. 
The weaker assumption, of course, is (9"), and it is all I need for my purposes 
here. The ways in which an omnipotent God might have brought about (9") are 
limited only by one's imagination, and there is no need to specify anyone of 
them here. 
In this brief account of (8), (9), and (10), I cannot hope to have given either 
an adequate presentation of these doctrines or a sufficient answer to the questions 
they raise. But my sketchy treatment indicates, I think, both that none of these 
three beliefs is demonstrably false and that there are some reasonable arguments 
against the charges that (8) and (10) are themselves incompatible with God's 
goodness. Those results are enough to enable me to use (8)-(10) in an attempt 
to show how on Christian beliefs the existence of evil is compatible with the 
existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God. 
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III 
According to the Christian beliefs summarized as (8), (9), and (10), all human 
beings since Adam's fall have been defective in their free wills, so that they 
have a powerful inclination to will what they ought not to will, to will their own 
power or pleasure in preference to greater goods. It is not possible for human 
beings in that condition to go to heaven, which consists in union with God; and 
hell understood in Dantean terms is arguably the best alternative to annihilation. 
A good God will want to fix such persons, to save them from hell and bring 
them to heaven; and as the creator of these persons, God surely bears some 
responsibility for fixing and saving them if he can. How is he to do so? 
It seems to me clear that he cannot fix the defect by using his omnipotence 
to remove it miraculously. The defect is a defect in free will, and it consists in 
a person's generally failing to will what he ought to will. To remove this defect 
miraculously would be to force a person's free will to be other than it is; it would 
consist in causing a person to will freely what he ought to will. But it is logically 
impossible for anyone to make a person freely will something, and therefore 
even God in his omnipotence cannot directly and miraculously remove the defect 
in free will, without destroying the very freedom of the will he wants to fix. 
Someone might object here that if the defect in the will is inheritable without 
prejudice to the freedom of the will, then it is also removable without detriment 
to the freedom of the will; and if it destroys freedom to have God remove the 
defect, then it also destroys freedom to have the defect inherited. This objection, 
I think, is based on a mistaken picture of the inheritance of the defect. If the 
traditional doctrine were that after the time of Adam's fall, human beings whose 
wills were in a pre-fall state suddenly acquired fallen, defective wills, then this 
objection would be sound. And perhaps the use of the word 'inheritance', with 
its suggestions of one individual suddenly receiving something from another, 
invites such a picture. But in fact the doctrine of Adam's fall makes it clear that 
in the transmission of the defect there is no change of will on the part of post-fallen 
men. What the doctrine specifies is that individuals conceived and born after 
Adam's fall have defective wills from the very beginning of their existence. 
There is no change of will in this process; rather the process consists in the 
generation of persons whose free wills from birth are strongly inclined to certain 
sorts of evil actions. If God were to destroy such post-fall persons and generate 
new ones with non-defective wills (as I have argued he should not), he would 
not be violating the free wills of the new persons by so creating them any more 
than he violated Adam's free will when he created Adam in his pre-fall state. 
But if God intervenes to remove the defect in the wills of post-fall persons, he 
brings about a change in their wills; and this, I think, he cannot do if their wills 
are to remain free. 44 
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If God cannot by his omnipotence directly fix the defect in free will, it seems 
that human beings must fix it themselves. Self-repair is a common feature of 
the natural world, but I do not think self-repair is possible for a person with 
post-fall free will. People, of course, do sometimes reform their lives and change 
their habits; but one necessary condition for their doing so is that, for whatever 
purpose or motive, they will something different from what they previously 
willed. Analogously, to reform the will requires willing something different from 
what one previously willed; that is, it requires a change of will. But how to 
change the will is the problem in the first place. If we want to know whether a 
man himself can fix a defect in his will, whether he himself can somehow remove 
his tendency to will what he ought not to will, it is no help to be told that of 
course he can if he just wills to change his will. We know that a man can change 
his will for the better; otherwise his will would not be free. The problem with 
a defect in the will is not that there is an inability to will what one ought to will 
because of some external restraint on the will, but that one does not and will 
not will what one ought to will because the will itself is bent towards evil. 
Consequently, changing the will is the end for which we are seeking the means; 
if one were willing to change one's will by willing what one ought to will, there 
would be no problem of a defect in the will. 45 Self-repair, then, is no more a 
solution to the problem of a defective will than is God's miraculous intervention. 46 
If God cannot and human beings will not fix the defect in their wills, what 
possible cure is there? Christianity suggests what seems to me the only remaining 
alternative. Let a person will that God fix his defective will. In that case, God's 
alteration of the will is something the person has freely chosen, and God can 
then alter that person's will without destroying its freedom. It is a fact well-attested 
in religious literature that people who find it next to impossible to will what 
(they believe) they ought to will may nonetheless find it in themselves to will 
that God alter their wills. Perhaps two of the most famous examples are the 
sonnet of John Donne in which he prays for God to overwhelm him so that he 
will be chaste4 ? and Augustine's prayers that God give him continence.48 The 
traditional formulation of the crucial necessary condition for a person's being a 
Christian (variously interpreted by Protestants and Catholics) is that he wills God 
to save him from his sin; and this condition is, I think, logically (and perhaps 
also psychologically) equivalent to a person's willing that God fix his will. 
Willing to have God save one from one's sin is willing to have God bring one 
to a state in which one is free from sin, and that state depends essentially on a 
will which wills what it ought to will. 
What role God plays in man's coming to will that God fix his will is controv-
ersial in the history of Christian thought. Some Protestant theologians have 
argued that God bears sole responsibility for such willing; Pelagius apparently 
argued that all the responsibility belongs to man. The first of these positions 
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seems to me to have difficulties roughly analogous to those raised above by the 
suggestion that God might miraculously fix man's will, and the difficulties in 
the second are like those in the suggestion that a man himself might fix his own 
will. Perhaps the correct view here too consists in postulating a cooperative 
divine and human effort. Perhaps Socrates's way with those he encountered can 
serve as a model. When Socrates pursued a man with wit and care and passion 
for the truth, that man sometimes converted to philosophy and became Socrates's 
disciple. Such a man converted freely, so that it is false to say Socrates caused 
his conversion; and yet, on the other hand, it would be ridiculous to say in 
consequence that the man bears sole responsibility for his conversion. The respon-
sibility and the credit for the conversion belong to Socrates, whose effort and 
ingenuity were necessary conditions of the conversion. That they were not suf-
ficient conditions, however, and that the man nonetheless freely willed his con-
version is clear from the cases of men such as Alcibiades, whom Socrates sought 
but did not succeed in converting. Without rashly trying to adjudicate in a 
paragraph an old and complicated controversy, I think that something along 
those lines can also be said of the process by which a man comes to will God's 
help. God's efforts on behalf of Augustine are the necessary condition of Augus-
tine's conversion, and the credit for his conversion belongs to God; but God's 
efforts are not a sufficient condition, and so Augustine's free will is not impugned. 
Or, as Anselm says with regard to the fall of the angels, "although the good 
angel received perseverance [in willing what he ought to will] because God gave 
it, it is not the case that the evil angel did not receive it because God did not 
give it. But rather, God did not give it because Satan did not receive it, and he 
did not receive it because he was unwilling to receive it."49 
At any rate, if a man does will that God fix his will or save him from his 
sins, then I think that God can do so without detriment to free will, provided 
trat he does so only to the extent to which the man freely wills that God do so. 
There is in principle no reason why a person could not will at once that God fix 
the whole defect of his will; but in general, perhaps because of the extent of the 
defect in the will, people seem to tum from their own evil in a series of small-scale 
reforms. In Book VIII, chapter VII, of the Confessions, Augustine describes 
himself as praying that God give him chastity and making the private reservation 
'but not yet' . If God were immediately to give Augustine chastity in such a case, 
he would in fact be doing so against Augustine's will. And so, in general, God's 
fixing the will seems to be a lengthy process, in which a little willing produces 
a little fixing, which in tum promotes more willing of more fixing. On Christian 
doctrine, this is the process of sanctification, which is not finally completed until 
after death when it culminates "in the twinkling of an eye" in the last changes 
which unite the sanctified person with God. 50 
The fixing of a defective free will by a person's freely willing that God fix 
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his will is, I think, the foundation of a Christian solution to the problem of evil. 
What sort of world is most conducive to bringing about both the initial human 
willing of help and also the subsequent process of sanctification? To answer that 
question, we need to consider the psychological state of a person who wills 
God's help. Apart from the obvious theological beliefs, such a person must also 
hold that he tends to do what he ought not to do and does so because he himself 
wills what he ought not to will, and he must want not to be in such a condition. 
He must, in other words, have both a humbling recognition of himself as evil 
and a desire for a better state. So things that contribute to a person's humbling, 
to his awareness of his own evil, and to his unhappiness with his present state 
contribute to his willing God's help. 
I think that both moral and natural evil make such a contribution. The unpre-
vented gross moral evils in the course of human history show us something about 
the nature of man, and our own successful carrying out of our no doubt smaller-
scaled evil wills shows us that we are undeniably members of the species. Natural 
evil-the pain of disease, the intermittent and unpredictable destruction of natural 
disasters, the decay of old age, the imminence of death-takes away a person's 
satisfaction with himself. It tends to humble him, show him his frailty, make 
him reflect on the transience of temporal goods, and tum his affections towards 
other-worldly things, away from the things of this world. No amount of moral 
or natural evil, of course, can guarantee that a man will seek God's help. If it 
could, the willing it produced would not be free. But evil of this sort is the best 
hope, I think, and maybe the only effective means, for bringing men to such a 
state. 
That natural evil and moral evil, the successful carrying out of evil human 
wills, serve to make men recognize their own evils, become dissatisfied with 
things of this world, and tum to God is a controversial claim; and it is clear that 
a compelling argument for or against it would be very difficult to construct. To 
produce such an argument we would need a representative sample, whatever 
that might be, of natural and moral evil. Then we would need to examine that 
sample case by case to determine the effect of the evil in each case on the human 
beings who suffered or perpetrated it. To determine the effect we would have 
to know the psychological and moral state of these people both before and after 
the evil at issue (since the effect would consist in some alteration of a previous 
state); and we would have to chart their state for the rest of their lives after that 
evil because, like the effect of carcinogens, the effect of the experience of evil 
may take many years to manifest itself. Even with the help of a team of 
psychologists and sociologists, then, it would be hard to collect the data necessary 
to make a good argument for or against this claim. Hence, I am unable to present 
a cogent argument for one of the main claims of this paper, not because of the 
improbability of the claim but because of the nature of the data an argument for 
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the claim requires; and perhaps it should just be categorized as one more Christian 
belief and added as (11) to the list of (8), (9), and (10) as a traditionally held, 
not demonstrably false Christian belief. sl Still, there is some historical evidence 
for it in the fact that Christianity has tended to flourish among the oppressed 
and decline among the comfortable, and perhaps the best evidence comes from 
the raising of children. The phrase 'spoiling a child' is ambiguous in current 
parlance between 'turning a child into a unpleasant person' and 'giving a child 
everything he wants', and the ambiguity reflects a truth about human nature. 
The pains, the hardships, the struggles which children encounter tend to make 
them better people. Of course, such experiences do not invariably make children 
better; children, like adults, are also sometimes made worse by their troubles. 
But that fact would be a counter-example to the general claim about the function 
of evil in the world only in case it maintained that evil was guaranteed to make 
people better; and that is something this claim could not include and still be 
compatible with Christianity as long as Christianity is committed to the view 
that human beings have free will. 
Someone may object here that the suffering of children is just what this 
attempted solution to the problem of evil cannot explain. In The Brothers 
Karamazov, Dostoevsky provides the m.ost eloquent presentation this objection 
is likely ever to get, concluding with Ivan's passionate insistence (implicit in a 
question addressed to Alyosha) that even if the whole world could be saved for 
eternal bliss by the torture of one innocent child, allowing the torture of that 
child for that purpose would be horribly wrong. I am in sympathy with the 
attitude Dostoevsky has Ivan express and in agreement with Ivan's conclusion. 
The suffering of children is in my view unquestionably the instance of evil most 
difficult for the problem of evil, and there is something almost indecent about 
any move resembling an attempt to explain it away. The suffering of children 
is a terrible thing, and to try to see it otherwise is to betray one's humanity. 
Any attempt to solve the problem of evil must try to provide some understanding 
of the suffering of children, but it must not lessen our pain over that suffering 
if it is not to become something monstrous and inhumane. 
With considerable diffidence, then, I want to suggest that Christian doctrine 
is committed to the claim that a child's suffering is outweighed by the good for 
the child which can result from that suffering. This is a brave (or foolhardy) 
thing to say, and the risk inherent in it is only sharpened when one applies it to 
cases in which infants suffer, for example, or in which children die in their 
suffering. Perhaps the decent thing to do here is simply to sketch some consid-
erations which may shed light on these hard cases. To begin with, it is important 
to remember that on Christian doctrine death is not the ultimate evil or even the 
ultimate end, but rather a transition between one form of life and another. From 
a Christian point of view, the thing to be avoided at all costs is not dying, but 
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 411 
dying badly; what concerns the Christian about death is not that it occurs but 
that the timing and mode of death be such as to constitute the best means of 
ensuring that state of soul which will bring a person to eternal union with God. 
If children who die in their suffering thereby move from the precarious and 
frequently painful existence of this world to a permanently blissful existence in 
the other world and if their suffering was among part of the necessary means to 
effect that change, their suffering is justified. I am not trying to say here that 
the suffering which a child or any other person experiences is the only way in 
which that person could be brought to God. Rather, I am trying to avoid con-
structing the sort of explanation for evil which requires telling the sufferer that 
God lets him suffer just for the sake of some abstract general good for mankind. 
Perhaps it is true that such a general good-the significant freedom of created 
persons, for example-is the ultimate end for the sake of which God permits 
evil. It seems to me nonetheless that a perfectly good entity who was also 
omniscient and omnipotent must govern the evil resulting from the misuse of 
that significant freedom in such a way that the sufferings of any particular person 
are outweighed by the good which the suffering produces for that person; other-
wise, we might justifiably expect a good God somehow to prevent that particular 
suffering, either by intervening (in one way or another) to protect the victim, 
while still allowing the perpetrator his freedom, or by curtailing freedom in some 
select cases. 52 And since on Christian doctrine the ultimate good for persons is 
union with God, the suffering of any person will be justified if it brings that 
person nearer to the ultimate good in a way he could not have been without the 
suffering. I think that Christianity must take some such approach to the suffering 
or death of children; and perhaps something analogous can be said in connection 
with the hardest case of all, the suffering of infants. Psychologists tell us that 
the first year of a child's life is tremendously important in molding the personality 
and character. For some persons the molding of the personality produced by 
suffering in infancy may be the best means of insuring a character capable of 
coming to God. 53 
In all these hard cases, the difficulty of formulating a Christian position which 
does not appear either implausible or inhuman will be diminished if we have 
clearly in mind the view of man Christianity starts with. On Christian doctrine, 
all human beings are suffering from the spiritual equivalent of a terminal disease; 
they have a defect in the will which if not corrected will cost them life in heaven 
and consign them to a living death in hell. Now suppose that we are the parents 
of a child with a terminal brain disease, which includes among its symptoms 
the child's rejecting the notion that he is sick and refusing to cooperate in any 
treatments. The doctors tell us that there are treatments which may well cure 
the child completely, but they hurt and their success is not guaranteed. Would 
we not choose to subject the child to the treatments, even if they were very 
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painful? The child's suffering would be a terrible thing; we would and we should 
be grieved at it. But we would nonetheless be glad of the treatments and hope 
of a cure. And yet this example is only a pale reflection of what Christianity 
claims to be the case for all human beings, where the loss inflicted by the disease 
and the benefits of its cure are infinitely greater. If moral and natural evil contain 
an essential ingredient of a possible cure, surely the cure is worth the suffering 
such evil entails. 
It might seem to some people that if this is God's plan, it is a tragic failure 
because the amount of evil in the world produces so few cures. The vast majority 
of people in the world are not Christians or theists of any kind; and even among 
those who are Christian many die in serious unrepented evil. But this complaint 
rests on an assumption for which we have no evidence, namely, that the majority 
of people end in hell. That even an evil-doer who dies a sudden, unexpected 
death may not die impenitent is shown vividly by Dante: 
1 am Buonconte ... wounded in the throat, flying on foot and bloodying 
the plain [I came]. There 1 lost my sight and speech. I ended on the 
name of Mary, and there I fell, and my flesh remained alone .... The 
Angel of God took me, and he from Hell cried, '0 you from Heaven, 
why do you rob me? You carry off with you the eternal part of him for 
one little tear which takes him from me'. 54 
As for those who live and die without the religious knowledge necessary for 
redemption from evil, it is not incompatible with Christian doctrine to speculate 
that in the process of their dying God acquaints them with what they need to 
know and offers them a last chance to choose. 55 Such a speculation might seem 
to vitiate the justification for evil which I have been developing in this paper, 
because if the whole process of redemption can be begun and completed in a 
person's dying hour, why do we need evil in the world? But this is a mistaken 
objection, because surely in any sort of deathbed repentance the sufferings of 
the dying person will have had a significant effect on that person's character 
and consequently on the choices he makes on his deathbed. So as long as some 
such speculation is not incompatible with Christian doctrine, it is not at all clear 
that the majority of people end in hell. And without that assumption the complaint 
that God's plan for the use of evil is a failure is altogether unwarranted. 
Someone might also object here that this solution to the problem of evil 
prohibits us from any attempt to relieve human suffering and in fact suggests 
that we ought to promote it, as the means of man's salvation. Such an objection 
is mistaken, I think, and rests on an invalid inference. Because God can use 
suffering to cure an evil will, it does not follow that we can do so also. God 
can see into the minds and hearts of human beings and determine what sort and 
amount of suffering is likely to produce the best results; we cannot. (Our inability 
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to do so is in fact one of the things which make it so difficult to discuss cases 
of infant suffering, for example.) Furthermore, God as parent creator has a right 
to, and a responsibility for, painful correction of his creatures, which we as 
sibling creatures do not have. Therefore, since all human suffering is prima facie 
evil, and since we do not know with any high degree of probability how much 
(if any) of it is likely to result in good to any particular sufferer on any particular 
occasion, it is reasonable for us to eliminate the suffering as much as we can. 
At any rate, the attempt to eliminate suffering is likely to be beneficial to our 
characters, and passivity in the face of others' suffering will have no such good 
effects. 56 
IV 
The solution to the problem of evil I have been developing will be clarified 
further by being applied to an individual instance of evil. The instance I want 
to consider is the Old Testament story of Cain and Abel. 57 For my purposes 
here, this biblical story of an instance of evil has several advantages over a 
description of an instance of evil drawn from such sources as the newspapers. 
The biblical story contains a description of God's intervention or lack of interven-
tion in human history, and it includes an account of the inner thoughts and 
motivations of the principal characters. To the extent to which Christians are 
committed to accepting the Bible as the revealed word of God, to that extent 
they are committed to accepting this story as veridical also; and that fact obviously 
contributes to the use I want to make of the story. Finally, although the story 
of Cain and Abel is regularly taken by Christians as a paradigmatic ally moral 
and religious story, suitable for the edification of children, the incidents related 
in the story are such that a twentieth-century atheistic philosopher might have 
invented them as a showcase for the problem of evil. 
Cain and Abel are two brothers who bring offerings to God. 58 Abel's offering 
is accepted, but Cain's is not-why, the story does not say.59 In consequence, 
Cain is very angry at Abel. The story suggests that acceptance or rejection of 
the offerings is an (at least temporary) acceptance or rejection of the offerer; 
and Cain's anger at Abel apparently stems from jealousy over God's favoring 
Abel rather than Cain. Now there is something double-minded in Cain's anger 
and jealousy. Either God is right to reject Cain's offering-because there was 
something about it or about the person who brought it which made it objectively 
unacceptable-and in that case there are no grounds for anger; or God is wrong 
to reject Cain's offering-because it was a perfectly good offering brought in 
an altogether appropriate spirit-and in that case God is not good. And although 
one might then still be afraid of the consequences of incurring God's displeasure 
or resent those more favored by God, a single-minded belief that God's standards 
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for accepting offerings are bad precludes jealousy towards those who are accepted. 
That Cain is angry and jealous indicates that he is double-minded about whether 
God is right to reject his offering. 
Although he does reject Cain's offering, God does not leave Cain to himself 
in his double-minded anger. He comes to him and talks to him, asking Cain 
Socratic questions designed to get him to recognize and resolve his double-min-
dedness: "Why are you angry?"; "If you do well, will you not be accepted?". 
And God goes on to give Cain a warning, that he is in danger of sin. So God 
apparently anticipates Cain's attack on his brother, and he intervenes to warn Cain. 
But Cain attacks and kills his brother. Abel, who has just been accepted by 
God and is evidently righteous, suffers violent and untimely death. When the 
killing is over, God speaks to Cain again, asking him more careful questions 
designed to lead him to confess his deed: first, "Where is Abel?", and then after 
the evasive response to that question, the stronger question "What have you 
done?". When Cain is obstinate in his evil, God punishes him by miraculously 
intervening in nature: the ground will be barren when Cain tills it, and apparently 
only when Cain tills it. Finally, we have the last piece of God's care for Cain 
in this story: Cain says his punishment is more than he can bear, and God 
comforts him by protecting him against being killed by other men, a danger 
Cain had understood to be part of his punishment. 
Now consider God's actions in this story. In the first place, he punishes Cain 
for the murder of Abel, showing thereby that he regards the murder of Abel as 
bad and worthy of punishment. And yet he himself allowed the murder to take 
place, although obviously he could have prevented it. Any decent person who 
was present when Cain attacked his brother would have made some effort to 
rescue Abel; but God, who is always present everywhere and who even seems 
to anticipate Cain's attack, does nothing for Abel. On the other hand, consider 
what God does to or for Cain. He comes to him and warns him of the coming 
temptation. After the murder he returns to talk to Cain again, in a way designed 
to make Cain acknowledge his true state. When he imposes punishment, he does 
it in a way that seems to require a miracle. He banishes Cain from his land. 
And when Cain complains that his punishment is too much, God is merciful to 
him and guards him from being killed by other men. In short, God interferes in 
Cain's affairs to warn him; he talks to him earnestly to get him to see his true 
situation; he performs a miracle on his behalf; he sends him away from his own 
place; and he protects him from being murdered. Clearly, anyone of these things 
done on Abel's behalf would have been enough to save him. But God does none 
of these things for Abel, the innocent, the accepted of God; he does them instead 
for Cain, a man whose offering was rejected and who is murderously angry at 
his brother. When it comes to righteous Abel, God simply stands by and watches 
him be killed. Why has such a story been allowed to stand as part of the canonical 
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Scriptures? 
On the solution to the problem of evil which I have been developing in this 
paper, if God is good and has a care for his creatures, his overriding concern 
must be to insure not that they live as long as possible or that they suffer as 
little pain as possible in this life but rather that they live in such a way as 
ultimately to bring them to union with God. 
Abel presents God with no problems in this respect. He is apparently righteous 
at the time of his offering; and hence that is a safe, even a propitious, time for 
him to die, to make the transition from this life to the next. Given that he will 
die sometime, Abel's death at this time is if anything in Abel's interest; he dies 
at a time when he is accepted by God, and he enters into union with God. It is 
true that Abel dies prematurely and so is deprived of years of life. But on 
Christian doctrine, what he loses is years of a painful and spiritually perilous 
pilgrimage through this life, and what he gains is eternal bliss. 60 
Cain, on the other hand, is in trouble as regards both his current moral state 
and his prospects for the next life. If God were to rescue Abel by striking Cain 
with heart failure at the outset of Cain's attack on Abel, for example, Cain would 
die in mortal sin and so would go to hell, while righteous Abel would continue 
the morally dangerous journey of this life only to die later, perhaps in some less 
virtuous state. There are, of course, many other ways in which God could have 
stopped Cain and rescued Abel without going so far as killing Cain. But perhaps 
stopping Cain even in those other ways would not have been good for Cain. 
Because God does not step in between Cain's willing and the successful realization 
of that willing, Cain is brought as forcefully as possible to a recognition of the 
depth of the evil he willed. And that forceful recognition is, I think, the most 
powerful means of bringing Cain to an acknowledgment of his own evil and a 
desire for help, which is a necessary condition for his salvation. 
On the solution to the problem of evil which I have been developing here, 
then, God does not rescue Abel because contrary to appearances Abel is not in 
danger; and God's failure to rescue Abel, as well as all the other care for Cain 
recorded in the story, constitutes the best hope of a rescue for Cain, who is in 
danger, and not just of death but of a perpetual living death. 
v 
I think, then, that it is possible to produce a defensible solution to the problem 
of evil by relying both on the traditional theological and philosophical assumptions 
in (1)-(4) and (6), and on the specifically Christian doctrines in (8)-(10). Like 
other recent attempted solutions, this one also rests fundamentally on a revised 
version of (7), namely, this: 
(7"') Because it is a necessary condition for union with God, the signif-
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icant exercise of free will employed by human beings in the process 
which is essential for their being saved from their own evil is of such 
great value that it outweighs all the evil of the world. 
(7"') constitutes a morally sufficient reason for evil and so is a counter-example 
to (5), the claim that there is no morally sufficient reason for God to permit 
instances of evil. Like the positions of both Planting a and Swinburne, this solution 
ties the justification for natural evils to free will, but in a way, I think, which 
does not raise the problem of evil all over again (as Plantinga's free will defense 
seems to do by leaving unjustified the successful acting on evil free will) and 
which shows a necessary connection between natural evil and the good that 
justifies it (as Swinburne's solution does not). Of the three solutions initially 
sketched in this paper, it is Hick's approach which my own solution most 
resembles; but the resemblance is only superficial. In reality, my solution is 
fundamentally different from Hick's both in its view of human beings and in its 
analysis of the function of evil, and so it escapes the basic criticisms of Hick's 
theodicy mentioned above. The changes in human beings which evil is said to 
produce on the solution I have developed here are logically necessary for union 
with God and life in heaven, as is not the case in Hick's account. And because 
of the particular nature of these changes, involving a fundamental change in the 
will, they could not be produced in any other way; unlike the changes which 
evil produces on Hick's view, these changes could not be brought about just by 
training for the Olympics or by writing a doctoral dissertation, for example. 
Although I have argued against the solutions proposed by Planting a , Swin-
burne, and Hick, I think that each of them makes an important contribution to 
a successful solution of the problem of evil; and what I find right in their work 
is, I think, compatible with the solution I have presented here. For example, 
there is a sense of 
(7) 'The possession of free will and the use of it to do more good than 
evil is a good of such value that it outweighs all the evil in the world' 
which is true on Christian beliefs, I think, and compatible with my solution. On 
my solution, Christianity must assign an enormous value to free will, because 
the evil of Adam's fall and all subsequent moral and natural evil could have 
been prevented if human beings had never been given free will in the first place. 
But the good which free will produces and which outweighs subsequent evil 
should be understood, on my account, not just as morally good choices but rather 
as willing in accordance with the divine will and thus making possible union 
with God. 
Furthermore, although I have argued for one particular good as the good which 
justifies moral and natural evil, nothing in my account rules out the possibility 
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that either sort of evil may produce other goods as well. Thus I think Swinburne 
is right in his claim about the importance of our ability to act on our free will 
in significant ways. If our use of free will were restricted to trivial choices to 
prevent the possibility of our doing any major harm or if God always stepped 
in to remove the evil consequences of any bad act of will, I think Swinburne is 
right to claim we would be more like pets in God's dollhouse than like persons. 
So it seems to me that significant exercise of free will is a good which could 
only be produced by God's allowing evil and which therefore partially justifies 
the moral (but not the natural) evil in the world. On my account, however, what 
ultimately gives exercise of free will its main value is its necessary role in 
producing union with God; and it is this significant exercise of free will, a bent 
free will cooperating in its own cure, which I have argued outweighs all the evil 
in the world. So there is a sense of (7') too which is true on my solution. 
I also think Hick is clearly right that some of the suffering produced by moral 
and natural evil results in character-building, so that some moral virtues are 
another good produced by evil. The problem with Hick's account is that the 
character-building he picks out to discuss could apparently be produced without 
any major moral or natural evil; hence the good produced by evil on Hick's 
account is not a good which can justify the evil in the world. But if we take 
character-building in the way I have described in my solution, not (like Hick) 
as an evolution from good to better, but as an alteration from a destructive 
psychological state to a life-giving one, then I think there is a reading of (7") 
too which is true on Christian doctrine and compatible with my solution. 
Finally, for the many other goods sometimes said to be produced by evil, 
such as punishment for sins or aesthetic completion of the whole canvas of 
creation, if any of these are in fact both good and produced by evil, I welcome 
them into my account. In (7"') I have singled out one good produced by evil as 
the good which justifies aU the evil in the world, but nothing in this claim rules 
out the possibility that evil produces various other lesser goods as well which 
may contribute to the justification of some sorts of evil. 
In the brief exposition of this solution in this paper, I cannot hope to have 
given anything but a sketch and a preliminary defense of it; to do it justice and 
to consider carefully all the questions and objections it raises would require 
book-length treatment. For all its complexity, the story of Cain and Abel is the 
story of a simple instance of evil, which is easily dwarfed by any account of 
evil culled at random from today's newspapers; and I am under no illusions that 
by providing an explanation for the simple evil in the story of Cain and Abel, 
I have given a sufficient and satisfying explanation of even the commonplace 
evils of ghetto violence, much less the almost unthinkable evils of Bel sen or 
Hiroshima. What I would like to believe I have done is to have shown that with 
good will and careful attention to the details of the doctrines specific to a particular 
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monotheism there is hope of a successful solution to the problem of evil along 
the lines developed here. 61 
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58. Literary analysis of the story suggests, however slightly, that the idea of bringing an offering 
was Cain's and that Abel was following Cain's lead: "And in process of time it came to pass that 
Cain brought of the fruit of the ground an offering to the Lord. And Abel, he also brought of the 
firstlings of his flock ... " (Gen. 4:3-4). Furthermore, there is no suggestion that the offerings were 
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anything but gifts of love. There is no hint that Cain is afraid of God or has a gUilty conscience and 
wants to propitiate God or wants to lessen the post-fall alienation between him and God. On the 
contrary, when we find Cain talking to God later in the story, he speaks to him familiarly and 
without fear, and without surprise either, as if he were used to talking to God. These two suggestions 
taken together considerably increase the poignancy of the story. Among other things, they make the 
rejection of Cain's offering much harder for him to accept and for us to understand; they make more 
plausible the depth of the anger against Abel which the story attributes to Cain; and they suggest 
(again, however slightly) a loving relationship between Cain and God, in the context of which God's 
subsequent talking with Cain should be considered. 
59. There is nothing in the story to suggest directly that there was anything wrong with Cain's 
offering. The story does say that Abel brought of the "firstlings" of his flock, suggesting that there 
was something specially reverent or respectful about his offerings; but the text says nothing to 
indicate that there was anything shabby or improper about Cain's offering. It seems to me that there 
is admirable artistry in the story's omitting to explain why Cain's offering was rejected. By doing 
so, it leaves its readers with the same choice Cain had: to believe either that God is good and Cain's 
offering was rightly rejected, or that Cain's offering was rejected arbitrarily and so unjustly by a 
God who is in consequence not good. The story, then, artfully forces its readers into Cain's shoes 
and faces them with Cain's temptation, the first recorded temptation after the fall, namely, the 
temptation to believe that God is not good. 
60. As for the manner of Abel's death, we reasonably tend to assume that it was painful, but nothing 
in the story prohibits our believing that Abel died instantly, without pain. If we think that Abel in 
the story is spotlessly righteous, then since the story gives us the option, it is more consistent to 
assume he died painlessly. On the other hand, if we are inclined to maintain that Abel's death was 
painful to some degree, then that pain is explicable as a last safeguard against pride and self-will 
for the first of the sons of Adam to die. There is also Adam and Eve's loss to be taken into account. 
On our ordinary unreflective intuitions about this story, Adam and Eve suffer the loss of their son 
Abel, a loss for which they are apparently uncompensated. But as I have tried to show, on Christian 
doctrine the story is much more complicated. Once Cain becomes murderously angry at his brother, 
God has a choice only between evils for Adam and Eve. They can suffer the pain of the physical 
loss of their son Abel, or they can suffer the pain of having their son Cain spiritually lost. The 
arguments I have given for my solution to the problem of evil are also arguments for thinking that 
by choosing to let Abel die God picks the lesser of two evils for Adam and Eve also. 
61. This paper has benefited substantially from comments by William Alston, Frank Burch Brown, 
Earle Coleman, Alvin Plantinga, Georgette Sinkler, Michael Smith, and Richard Swinburne. I am 
especially grateful to Norman Kretzmann for his numerous helpful suggestions, and I am indebted 
to John Crossett (+ 1981), whose efforts on my behalf made this paper possible. 
